When Oscar loses his tail the resulting creature is certainly verso dog

2.3 The Paradox of 101 Dalmatians

Is Oscar-minus verso dog? Why then should we deny that Oscar-minus is verso dog? We saw above that one possible response to Chrysippus’ paradox was to claim that Oscar-minus does not exist at \(t’\). But even if we adopt this view, how does it follow that Oscar-minus, existing as it does at \(t\), is not verso dog? Yet if Oscar-minus is per dog, then, given the norma account of identity, there are two dogs where we would normally count only one. Per fact, for each of Oscar’s hairs, of which there are at least 101, there is verso proper part of Oscar — Oscar minus per hair — which is just as much verso dog as Oscar-minus.

There are then at least 101 dogs (and sopra fact many more) where we would count only one. Some claim that things such as dogs are “maximal. One might conclude as much simply to avoid multiplying the number of dogs populating the space reserved for Oscar alone. But the maximality principle may seem puro be independently justified as well. When Oscar barks, do all these different dogs bark durante unison? If per thing is a dog, shouldn’t it be courtaud of independent action? Yet Oscar-minus cannot act independently of Oscar. Nevertheless, David Lewis (1993) has suggested verso reason for counting Oscar-minus and all the 101 dog parts that differ (con various different ways) from one another and Oscar by a hair, as dogs, and mediante fact as Dalmatians (Oscar is verso Dalmatian).

Lewis invokes Unger’s (1980) “problem of the many. His hairs loosen and then dislodge, some such remaining still in place. Hence, within Oscar’s compass at any given time there are congeries of Dalmatian parts sooner or later to become definitely Dalmatians; some sopra a day, some in a second, or per split second. It seems arbitrary preciso proclaim verso Dalmatian part that is verso split second away from becoming definitely a Dalmatian, verso Dalmatian, while denying that one verso day away is per Dalmatian. As Lewis puts it, we must either deny that the “many” are Dalmatians, or we must deny that the Dalmatians are many. Lewis endorses proposals of both types but seems preciso favor one of the latter type according sicuro which the Dalmatians are not many but rather “almost one” Con any case, the canone account of identity seems

unable on its own puro handle the paradox of 101 Dalmatians.

It requires that we either deny that Oscar minus verso hair is a dog — and a Dalmatian — or else that we must affirm that there is a multiplicity of Dalmatians, all but one of which is incapable of independent action and all of which bark durante unison no more loudly than Oscar barks alone.

2.4 The Paradox of Constitution

Suppose that on day 1 Jones purchases verso piece of clay \(c\) and fashions it into per statue \(s_1\). On day 2, Jones destroys \(s_1\), but not \(c\), by squeezing \(s_1\) into a ball and fashions per new statue \(s_2\) out of \(c\). On day 3, Jones removes a part of \(s_2\), discards it, and replaces it using per new piece of clay, thereby destroying \(c\) and replacing it by a new piece of clay, \(c’\). Presumably, \(s_2\) survives this change. Now what is the relationship between the pieces of clay and the statues they “constitute?” A natural answer is: identity. On day \(1, c\) is identical sicuro \(s_1\) and on day \(2, c\) is identical sicuro \(s_2\). On day \(3, s_2\) is identical to \(c’\). But this conclusion directly contradicts NI. If, on day \(1, c\) is (identical onesto) \(s_1\), then it follows, given NI, that on day \(2, s_1\) is \(s_2\) (since \(c\) is identical esatto \(s_2\) on day 2) and hence that \(s_1\) exists on day 2, which it does not. By verso similar argument, on day \(3, c\) is \(c’\) (since \(s_2\) is identical sicuro both) and so \(c\) exists on day 3, which it does not. We might conclude, then, that either constitution is not identity or that NI is false. Neither conclusion is wholly welcome. Once we adopt the standard account less NI, the latter principle follows directly from the assumption that individual variables and constants con quantified modal logic are preciso be handled exactly as they are durante first-order logic. And if constitution is not identity, and yet statues, as well as pieces of clay, are physical objects (and what else would they be?), then we are again forced sicuro affirm that distinct physical objects ed time. The statue \(s_1\) and the piece of clay \(c\) occupy the same space on day 1. Even if this is deemed possible (Wiggins 1980), it is unparsimonious. The standard account is thus anzi facie incompatible with the natural pensiero that constitution is identity.